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CHAPTER4 
The Dormant Commerce Clause 
and the Hormones Problem 
Donald H Regan 
It is obvious that no anti-discrimination regime can stop at forbidding explicit 
discrimination of the relevant sort. If only explicit discrimination is 
forbidden, lawmakers who want to discriminate can hide their discriminatory 
intentions behind facially neutral classifications that are nonetheless chosen 
because they differentially burden the protected class. So, we must be 
prepared to invalidate some facially neutral laws that have "discriminatory 
effect" or, as American lawyers often call it, "disparate impact." On the other 
hand, we cannot possibly invalidate all laws which have a disparate impact 
on a protected class; many perfectly reasonable laws adopted for completely 
innocent purposes will have such disparate impact. So, some laws with 
disparate impact must be upheld, and some must be invalidated. The question 
is how to draw the line. (I have intentionally not used the phrase '"de facto 
discrimination." This common phrase could be used simply as a synonym for 
"disparate impact" and could be similarly neutral on the ultimate issue of 
illegality. But my impression is that for many trade lawyers, "de facto 
discrimination" tends to mean laws with disparate impact that are in fact 
illegal, for whatever further reason is determinative. In contrast, in American 
constitutional law "de facto discrimination" normally connotes the absence of 
illegality. So the phrase seems best avoided.) 
As I say, the central question for this conference is how to decide which 
laws with disparate impact are illegal and which are not. But the first 
question that would occur to an American lawyer about the Arimani duck-
meat law (see Appendix, p. 359) is a different one, namely, whether the law 
is preempted by federal statute or administrative regulation. I suspect a strong 
case could be made that it is so preempted, although I have not pursued the 
matter, because that is obviously not the issue primarily relevant to this 
comparative exercise. I shall discuss the status of the Arimani law under the 
dormant commerce clause, on the assumption that it is not preempted by 
statute or regulation. Still, the issue of statutory preemption is worth 
mentioning, since the possibilities for statutory preemption may affect our 
approach to issues about preemption by fundamental law. The United States 
has a central legislature with regulatory powers and a history of using them 
that go far beyond any analogue in the European Union or the WTO. It is 
possible that differences of this sort may either explain (empirically) or 
92 The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation 
justifY (normatively) different approaches to fundamental law preemption in 
the three systems. 
In addition to the differences in institutional context, we cannot forget 
that the relevant legal texts in the three systems vary greatly in content and 
degree of specificity. The first duty of the judge is to apply the text that 
grounds her/his authority. The text the American judge is working with is so 
different from the texts that WTO tribunals are working with that there may 
not be much to be learned from American law about how disputes should be 
decided under, say, the SPS Agreement. (I would not say the same about the 
GATT itself.) If WTO tribunals were in the same situation as American 
judges--empowered by a text that is seen as giving them a mandate to create 
some trade-protective law but that offers no more specific direction-then I 
would recommend that WTO tribunals generally follow the American model 
(as I understand it) despite the differences in institutional context mentioned 
previously. As it is, I would merely urge, in the spirit of the American model 
and the text of the SPS Agreement itself, that the right of countries to choose 
their own level of SPS protection should not be reduced to an empty shell by 
excessively demanding standards for what constitutes a risk assessment, or 
scientific evidence, and so on. Given the text of the SPS Agreement, I find 
little to object to and much to praise in the Appellate Body's EU- Hormones 
decision, 1 but the result makes me uncomfortable. 
So, I'm not sure whether comparison will prove useful. But my mandate 
is to discuss the American law, so on with it. 
1. The Dormant Commerce Clause: Doctrine and Judicial Practice 
Doctrine 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the 
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the Indian tribes. "2 The states, unlike Congress, have 
whatever powers the Constitution does not forbid them. There is no provision 
of the Constitution that contains any explicit general limitation on the 
regulatory power of the states in favor of openness in trade; in that respect the 
Constitution differs fundamentally from the Treaty of Rome and the GATT 
(and later WTO agreements). It is well established, however, that the 
existence of the commerce power in Congress imposes some limits on state 
power even in the absence of any relevant legislation by Congress. The 
phrase "dormant commerce clause" (like the synonymous phrase "negative 
commerce clause") refers to the Commerce Clause as a source of such 
constitutional preemption. As far as I know, the origin of the phrase "dormant 
commerce clause" is Marshall's opinion in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh 
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Co., where he says the Delaware law is not "repugnant to the power to 
regulate commerce in its dormant state. "3 
I can simplifY the necessary discussion of the dormant commerce clause 
by observing that the Arimani law forbidding the sale of hormone-fed duck 
meat (a) is not a tax (nor a law that might run afoul of even a generalized 
"multiple burdens" analysis), (b) is not a regulation of the interstate 
transportation/communication system itself (railroads, telephones, and so on), 
and (c) presents no issue of extraterritoriality.4 Taxes, regulations of the 
transportation/communication system, and extraterritoriality all raise special 
issues which we would be required to attend to in a full discussion of 
dormant commerce clause doctrine. But in what follows I shall be discussing 
the dormant commerce clause as it applies to "core" cases that do not involve 
any such special considerations, like the Arimani duck case. 5 · 
The conventional wisdom takes as its scripture Justice Stewart's famous 
statement in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: "Where the statute regulates 
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits. "6 Or, as the conventional wisdom would be more likely to state 
matters: ( l) if the state law discriminates against interstate commerce, it is 
invalid; (2) if the state law does not discriminate against interstate commerce 
but nonetheless burdens interstate commerce, then we must balance the local 
benefits of the law against the burden on commerce to see if the law is 
justified. 7 
There are many difficulties with Stewart's formulation, and with the 
conventional wisdom based on it. The most obvious difficulty is that they do 
not tell us what it is for a law to regulate "evenhandedly," or conversely, what 
it is for a law to "discriminate." Some things are clear. First, a law that is 
motivated by protectionist purpose is invalid. Second, a law that 
discriminates explicitly against foreign commerce is "virtually per se 
illegal, "8 although the presumption of illegality may be overcome in the rare 
case where it can be argued that the explicit local/foreign discrimination is 
necessary to achieve a non-protectionist purpose.9 But what about facially 
neutral state laws that have a discriminatory effect? We have already seen 
that we cannot invalidate all such laws. How then do we decide which such 
laws to uphold and which to invalidate? One obvious answer (the right 
answer, to my mind) is that we should invalidate the law if and only if it was 
motivated by a bad purpose. I shall say more about that later. But the 
standard suggestion at this point is that we should balance the local benefits 
of the law against the burden on commerce represented by the discriminatory 
effect. 10 Notice that this standard moves together the "discrimination" part of 
the conventional test and the "balancing" part. That is no great harm in itself, 
though it may lead us to wonder whether the view has been well thought 
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through. It also brings forward another issue, whether balancing should be 
limited to those cases where there is discriminatory effect, or whether we 
should balance whenever there is a significant out-of-state cost from the 
statute, even if the statute is not discriminatory in any sense at all. (Here's an 
example: if Michigan, which has no tobacco-related industry of any sort, 
completely prohibited the sale of cigarettes, that would be a significant loss 
to tobacco farmers in Virginia and cigarette manufacturers in North Carolina; 
but there is no discriminatory effect.) The Pike test, as stated, clearly requires 
balancing even here, and so does the "virtual representation" argument for 
balancing favored by adherents of public choice theory (discussed in section 
2). But there is not a shred of evidence that the Court has ever actually 
engaged in balancing in "core" cases where there is no discriminatory effect. 
(As I shall explain, I don't think the Court actually balances in any core case, 
but there is at least some evidence for their balancing in discriminatory effect 
cases.) 
Judicial Practice 
We have been discussing some of the difficulties in expounding the 
conventional wisdom, but in my view the conventional wisdom is wrong at a 
much more fundamental level. There is no place at all for balancing in 
dormant commerce clause analysis (in the core cases), and the fundamental 
notion of discrimination which is relevant is purposeful discrimination. In the 
core area of the dormant commerce clause, a law is unconstitutional if and 
only if it has a protectionist purpose. It's that simple. (As I shall explain 
below, this leaves room for, indeed accounts for, the "virtual per se rule" 
against explicit discrimination.) This is not just what I think the law should 
be. It is what I think the law is. This is the best summary of what the Court 
has actually been doing for at least the last sixty years, despite their claims to 
the contrary. 
Of course, when I say "it's that simple," I mean the theory is simple. 11 I 
do not mean to suggest that it is always obvious whether there is protectionist 
purpose. No plausible theory can make every case an easy case. I shall say 
more in section 2 about how the purpose inquiry works, but one thing is 
worth saying immediately: outright assertions of protectionist purpose by 
legislators are neither necessary nor invariably sufficient for a finding of 
protectionist purpose. They are not necessary because the content and context 
of the law may make its bad purpose obvious even in the absence of any 
"smoking gun" in the legislative history. They are not invariably sufficient 
because a single statement by a single legislator, for example, may not reflect 
the thinking of her colleagues. Outright assertions of protectionist purpose 
are, of course, relevant, and they may in some cases be sufficient to show bad 
purpose. But in saying that the ultimate determinant of constitutional validity 
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is purpose, I am not remotely saying that this sort of evidence is all that 
matters. 
My claim that in the core cases a law violates the dormant commerce 
clause if and only if it has a protectionist purpose raises two obvious 
questions: ( 1) Given that the Court has explicitly announced a balancing test, 
what are my grounds for thinking they do not actually engage in balancing? 
(2) Could I possibly be right? Is it really plausible that the Court should so 
misdescribe its own behavior? 
Let me take the second question first. There is a very natural way for the 
Court to misdescribe its own behavior: it states the relevant test at too high a 
level of generality. 12 There is a place for balancing in certain dormant 
commerce clause cases outside what I have called the "core," most 
particularly where the state law regulates the interstate transportation/com-
munication system itself. In its statements of the dormant commerce clause 
test, the Court has generally not distinguished between such cases and my 
"core" cases, and a single test designed to cover both must necessarily 
mention balancing-but at the cost of misrepresenting the test the Court is 
actually applying to the larger part of the range of cases. Only recently has 
the Court noticed explicitly some of the distinctions among commerce clause 
cases that I suggest are crucial to understanding the Court's behavior; and in 
the process, the Court has intimated that balancing may indeed not be 
relevant in the core. 13 
We have seen how the Court might misdescribe its own behavior, but 
does it? What are my grounds for thinking the Court does not balance in core 
cases? After all, the famous Pike balancing test was announced in a core case 
(though the only significant precedents Stewart cites in support of the test are 
transportation cases). My grounds are a close reading of all the cases of the 
modem era (post-New Deal), not just looking for quotable quotes, but trying 
to see where and how in the opinions the cases are really being decided. I 
have developed my readings of all the major cases up to 1986 at length 
elsewhere, 14 and this is not the place for an extended recapitulation. But it 
may be useful to offer capsule discussions of some of the most famous cases, 
to give the flavor of my arguments. 
The earliest core dormant commerce clause cases that are still regularly 
cited are Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 15 and H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du 
Mond. 16 In Baldwin, the Court struck down a New York statute which 
prohibited the sale in New York of out-of-state milk for which the producers 
had been paid less than New York's own domestic minimum price to 
producers. In Hood, the Court invalidated the New York Commissioner of 
Agriculture's refusal to allow a Massachusetts milk distributor that sold its 
milk in Boston to build a new milk receiving depot in New York; the 
Commissioner's nominal ground was that the new depot would cause 
"destructive competition." Baldwin and Hood are both regarded by most 
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modem commentators as balancing cases, but in fact the Court does not even 
claim to balance in either case. The opinions are by Cardozo (Baldwin) and 
Jackson (Hood), two of the Court's greatest prose stylists, and they contain 
many purple passages about the importance of "economic union." But these 
oft-quoted passages are interlarded with references to tariffs, embargoes, 
customs duties, and the like (references that are often omitted when the 
passages are quoted). Those protectionist devices are the specific threats to 
"economic union" that both Cardozo and Jackson discuss. I think it is clear 
on an unprejudiced reading that in both cases what the Justices were 
concerned about, and what they thought they had identified, was thinly 
disguised protectionism. 17 
Consider next Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. itself, where the Court 
famously does claim to balance. The facially neutral Arizona statute in the 
case required only that cantaloupes grown in the state be packed in approved 
containers. What Bruce Church, the cantaloupe grower, was actually 
challenging was an order under the statute by an Arizona official, requiring 
Bruce Church to pack their cantaloupes in Arizona instead of transporting 
them in bulk across the border to a packing shed in California. There was no 
claim that this order was necessary to ensure that the cantaloupes were 
packed in the proper sort of container; it was stipulated that California had an 
identical packing requirement. Rather, the Arizona official defended his order 
as necessary to ensure that the Arizona cantaloupes were labeled as grown in 
Arizona. This is an unusual set of facts, and Stewart's opinion meanders, 
despite its brevity. In the end, Stewart invalidates the order on the ground that 
it is an explicit local-processing requirement (as indeed it is), and that such 
local-processing requirements are "virtually per se illegal." This rationale is 
completely sound, but it is not a balancing rationale (not even if we have to 
decide at some point that there is no claim of local benefit adequate to 
override the presumption of illegality). The virtual per se rule which 
constitutes the case against the order is best understood as part of an anti-
protectionism regime. The natural and best justification of the virtual per se 
rule is that explicit local-processing requirements, like other explicitly 
discriminatory commercial regulations, are virtually certain to be motivated 
by protectionist purpose. The reason is that non-protectionist purposes can 
normally be pursued without recourse to explicit discrimination. Pike 
announces a balancing test, but it is not a balancing case. 18 
Another famous "balancing" case, Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 19 
also involved an explicit local-processing requirement-in this case an 
ordinance of the city of Madison, Wisconsin, requiring that milk sold in the 
city as pasteurized to have been pasteurized and bottled within five miles of 
the city center. Again, Clark's opinion for the Court is a bit of a jumble, but in 
the end, it turns on the same sort of per se rule against explicit discrimination 
as Pike. Obviously, a full discussion would need to explain why explicit local 
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geographical discrimination (as in Dean Milk) should be assimilated to 
explicit state-line discrimination (as in Pike); but equally obviously, the 
explanation would provide no support for a general balancing approach.20 
Of the standard "balancing" precedents, the hardest to encapsulate briefly 
is Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,21 in which the 
Court struck down a North Carolina statute that prohibited the use of any 
grades other than USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) grades on closed 
containers of apples sold in North Carolina. The effect of the statute was both 
to deprive Washington apple growers of the advantage of their specially 
prestigious state grading system (arguably preferred by buyers to the USDA 
system), and also to impose on Washington growers the extra cost of printing 
up boxes without Washington grades on them for sale in North Carolina-all 
to the advantage of North Carolina apple growers. The statute was facially 
neutral, and Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, explicitly said he did 
not need to find a protectionist purpose. Nonetheless, to my mind the opinion 
makes it clear both that there was a protectionist purpose and that Burger 
thought so. (He may have been unwilling to rely on protectionist purpose 
because of the absence of any finding in the district court's opinion.) In the 
present context it must suffice to mention two features of the opinion. First, 
Burger goes out of his way to quote a "glaring" statement by the North 
Carolina Agriculture Commissioner which suggests the Commissioner 
thought the purpose of the statute was protectionist;22 this is the only instance 
in which he goes behind the district court's opinion to the record. Second, 
Burger's eventual argument that the statute achieves little or (probably) no 
local benefit is a priori. He argues that the statute could not possibly produce 
better informed purchasers (since it allows the sale of ungraded apples) and 
that it could not possibly achieve its putative goal of aiding consumers (since 
they never see the relevant containers). A case that is decidable by this sort of 
a priori argument is no precedent for judicial balancing in cases where there 
are genuinely contestable empirical issues about the law's effects. Also, what 
the Court can know a priori, the North Carolina legislature must have known, 
too. If the legislature knew they could not achieve their asserted objects, we 
can infer that they were attempting to disguise protectionism.23 
Moving forward, Edgar v. MITE Corp./4 decided in 1982, was regarded 
by some as an important precedent for balancing. The Court invalidated an 
Illinois anti-takeover statute that was drafted in such a way that it could apply 
to transactions occurring entirely outside Illinois in the shares of a non-
Illinois corporation with non-Illinois shareholders (if the corporation had its 
principal executive office in Illinois and at least ten percent of its stated 
capital and paid-in surplus were represented in Illinois). Justice White wrote 
a plurality opinion advancing three theories for invalidation: statutory 
preemption (by the federal Williams Act), extraterritoriality, and Pike 
balancing. Only one part of this opinion received five votes and became the 
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official opinion of the Court, the part relying on Pike. Despite appearances, 
Edgar was not a significant precedent for Pike balancing. There would have 
been five votes for the result of invalidation even if only the preemption and 
extraterritoriality theories had been considered. The Justice whose vote made 
Pike the nominal theory of the Court (and the only Justice who relied solely 
on Pike) was Justice Powell, whose vote was not necessary to dispose of the 
case even though it was the crucial fifth vote for one particular theory. Powell 
actually thought the case was moot; furthermore, everything in his opinion 
suggests that he would have preferred to uphold the Illinois statute(!); and he 
says explicitly that his reason for voting for the Pike theory is that it is less 
restrictive of state power in this area than the other two theories in the 
running.25 So, Edgar is not a genuine endorsement of Pike or ofbalancing.26 
Further confirmation may be found in the next case involving a state 
anti-takeover statute, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America/7 decided in 
1987. The Indiana statute in CTS Corp. differed from the Illinois statute in 
Edgar in that it regulated voting rights acquired by transactions in the shares 
of Indiana corporations. This is an important difference, but neither this 
difference nor any other difference between the statutes suggested that they 
should fare differently on a balancing analysis. The Court in CTS Corp. 
upholds the Indiana statute, without any citation of Pike (except when 
summarizing the opinion below that they are reversing) and without any 
balancing (indeed, disclaiming any intention to second-guess the empirical 
judgments of the state legislature). 28 Powell writes for the Court, and in his 
opinion in CTS Corp. he never even acknowledges that there was an "opinion 
of the Court" in Edgar, although it was his vote that created it. He refers 
consistently to White's "plurality opinion." Perhaps even more remarkable, 
White, in his dissent in CTS Corp., never mentions Pike, despite having 
written the Pike-based "opinion of the Court" in Edgar five years before. 
Both Powell and White focus in CTS Corp. on an issue of 
extraterritoriality-who is entitled to regulate the internal affairs of 
corporations? White also thinks the statute has a protectionist purpose. 
Balancing is nowhere in the picture. 29 
Since 1987, the Court has decided twenty-odd dormant commerce clause 
cases and invalidated eighteen statutes. In only one of those eighteen 
invalidations, Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, /nc./0 in 1988, 
does the Court even claim to balance; and it is doubtful whether there is 
really any balancing going on. The statute in issue tolls the statute of 
limitations for contract actions during any period when a defendant foreign 
corporation has not subjected itself to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio 
courts (even though the corporation may be amenable to suit during that 
period on all its Ohio-connected transactions under the Ohio long-arm 
statute). Kennedy, writing for the Court, says the Ohio law in question "might 
have been held to be a discrimination that invalidates without extended 
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inquiry" (in effect, it might have been held to be patently unjustified facial 
discrimination, as Scalia says it is in his concurrence), but Kennedy says he 
"chooses" to go on and balance anyway, without explaining why. There is, in 
fact, reason to go on, though not in the balancing direction; the case is trickier 
than it seems, and the facial discrimination claim by itself does not get right 
to the heart of the matter. After all, if Midwesco (the foreign defendant) 
simply submitted to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts, it would get 
the full benefit of the statute of limitations, and it would be no worse off in 
respect of susceptibility to suit than any Ohio corporation or any corporation 
permanently present in Ohio. The problem is that it seems Midwesco, as a 
foreign corporation with no permanent presence, is entitled to be somewhat 
better off in respect of susceptibility to suit. But what is required to explain 
this entitlement, and with it the vice in the Ohio statute, is not balancing; it is 
arguments about due process and/or what we might call "multiple 
administrative burdens."31 Kennedy's opinion does not make all of this clear; 
but his "balancing" discussion is as underdeveloped as Scalia claims in 
concurrence, and his opinion also clearly manifests the sort of "fairness" 
concerns I have indicated. I do not think it is balancing that really decides the 
case. 
Those (except for CTS Corp.) are the standard precedents for balancing 
in "core" cases. All of them. I have necessarily given only capsule 
discussions of each case, but those are all the cases. There are many other 
cases in which the Court gives a general statement of dormant commerce 
clause doctrine that refers to balancing, but then invalidates the law under 
some other part of the test without claiming to balance. There are also a few 
cases in which the Court claims to balance but upholds the law under review. 
I do not count these as precedents for balancing. If the Court really engaged 
in balancing, these cases would obviously be important in helping us to see 
how balancing worked; but where the very existence of the balancing test is 
in controversy, a case does not help to establish the reality of the test unless 
balancing determines an invalidation. A test which never bites is no test at 
all. Aside from that, even in the cases that claim to balance and then uphold 
the law, there is no real balancing. The prime example is Minnesota v. Clover 
Lea/Creamery Co.,32 in which the Court upheld a Minnesota statute which 
forbade the sale of milk in non-returnable plastic containers. Although the 
Court cites Pike and claims to balance, no "balancing" happens. Writing for 
the Court, Brennan notes that there is some discriminatory effect from the 
statute, which he says must be justified by some local benefit. But when it 
comes to the crucial issue of identifying the local benefits of the statute, 
Brennan refers back to his discussion of the benefits in the equal protection 
part of the opinion. However, in the latter, he said repeatedly that it was not' 
for the Court to decide whether there really were any benefits, only whether 
the legislature might have thought so. (This is standard equal protection 
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doctrine in the social/economic area.) In sum, Brennan never officially 
decides that there are any local benefits; nevertheless, he upholds the statute 
against dormant commerce clause challenge, and he upholds it in effect on 
the ground that the legislature thought there were benefits. That is not 
balancing; that is purpose analysis. The other cases that purport to apply Pike 
in the course of upholding a law do so even more cursorily. 
One final observation. It is not always obvious in a particular case 
whether the Court is really applying a purpose test or balancing. This is not 
surprising, since all of the evidence that would be relevant to "discriminatory 
effect" balancing is relevant to a purpose inquiry as well. Evidence of 
discriminatory effect inevitably suggests discriminatory purpose; similarly, 
evidence that minimizes the claimed non-protectionist local benefit suggests 
that the real purpose was protectionism. If I conclude from the Court's 
somewhat equivocal record that they are looking at purpose and not 
balancing, one reason is that they often clearly don't balance and they never 
clearly do; another reason is that the purpose approach makes most sense, as I 
shall argue in the next section. I hope I have said enough about the cases to 
dispel the thought that I am merely imputing my own view to the Court in the 
face of·the evidence. I have heard the suggestion that I am trying to read the 
Court's mind. In fact, I am reading their opinions-my radical idea is to pay 
attention to the whole opinion instead of just looking for the paragraph that is 
supposed to state "the test." 
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause: Theory 
I think the Court is right to eschew balancing and to rely entirely on an 
inquiry into legislative purpose in "core" dormant commerce clause cases. 
Since the most controversial part of my thesis is the rejection of balancing, it 
might seem natural to start with the case against balancing. But, in fact, there 
are surprising connections between the arguments for and against balancing 
and the arguments for and against purpose review--connections which go 
well beyond the crude point that if balancing and purpose review are 
alternatives, an argument against one is an argument for the other. In light of 
these connections, it makes best sense to start with the positive argument for 
purpose review. 
Legislative Purpose, Efficiency, and the "Virtual Representation" 
Argument for Balancing 
Why should we reject laws motivated by protectionist purpose? The central 
reason is that protectionism is inefficient. Protectionism can also embitter 
diplomatic relations and interfere with effective political integration, if that is 
a goal; but both in the contemporary United States, where political 
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integration has progressed beyond the Framers' wildest imaginings, and in the 
WTO, where political integration is not a goal at all, the threat to efficiency is 
surely the front-line objection to protectionism. So we shall focus on that. It 
is presumably not necessary to explain here in detail why protectionism is 
inefficient, but I want to remind the reader of the central point so that she will 
have it before her/his mind as we proceed. If the only purpose of a law is to 
transfer market share from foreign producers to local producers (the 
commonest protectionist scenario), then the law will normally be transferring 
business from low-cost foreign producers to high-cost local producers. This 
results in a misallocation of productive resources. Local consumers will lose, 
and the loss to local consumers will exceed any benefit to local producers; 
the law is Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. To be sure, the law might still be justified 
from a local perspective if it is the only politically feasible way to achieve a 
desirable redistribution; but when we then consider that protectionism invites 
retaliation (which may be simply irrational, or may be for bargaining 
purposes), we see that the overall consequences of collective behavior if 
protectionism is allowed are likely to be bad everywhere. 
It is crucial to see that the inefficiency of protectionism depends on the 
assumption that the purpose of the law in question is protectionist. 
Discriminatory effect flowing from a law which aims at and achieves some 
non-protectionist purpose does not suggest inefficiency in any way. For 
example, the law in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, discussed above, 
was not inefficient, despite its discriminatory effect. The law transferred 
business from low-cost foreign producers (of non-returnable plastic 
packaging for milk) to high-cost local producers (of paper packaging). 33 But 
the low-cost foreign producers were actually higher-cost, and the high-cost 
local producers were lower-cost, once the external environmental costs of the 
two sorts of packaging, as evaluated by the Minnesota legislature, were taken 
into account. The point is quite general: if the law in question achieves some 
non-protectionist purpose of the legislature, then discriminatory effect which 
is unavoidably incidental to the achievement of that purpose raises no 
efficiency concern; it just reveals that foreign actors are greater contributors 
to the problem the law is aimed at.34 
I have said that the law in Clover Leafis efficient if we take into account 
the environmental costs of different kinds of milk packaging as evaluated by 
the Minnesota legislature. But why is the Minnesota legislature the 
appropriate body to evaluate those costs? The first answer, of course, is that 
one of the primary objects of a federal or quasi-federal system is to allow for 
a variety of evaluative judgments at the lower level of government. It is 
perfectly in order for Minnesota to attach a higher value to its environment 
than, say, Illinois attaches to its own. And it is perfectly in order if Minnesota 
therefore forbids non-returnable plastic milk containers in Minnesota while 
Illinois allows them in Illinois. But there is still a possible objection. It is 
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often said that when the Minnesota legislature makes a decision that affects 
foreigners (out-of-staters), who are not represented in the Minnesota 
legislature, we need judicial oversight to take the interests of those foreigners 
into account. It is not enough, on this view, that Minnesota does not 
purposefully discriminate against foreigners; it is not enough that Minnesota 
acts on its own sincerely held non-protectionist values. If foreigners are made 
worse off by Minnesota's action, then even if that was no part of Minnesota's 
goal, courts must "balance" the foreign costs against the local benefits, to 
make sure the law is justified all things considered. We look to the court to 
give the affected foreigners "virtual representation" in the Minnesota 
legislative process. 
This may seem like a strong argument, but in the present context, it is 
specious. To see why, forget about the dormant commerce clause for a 
moment, and consider a pair of simpler examples. Imagine Jones, who 
regularly buys his groceries at the Mom&Pop Grocery. If one day, while 
driving to the Grocery, Jones loses control of his car and drives through the 
front display window, we would regard it as appropriate for a court to 
intervene and to consider, perhaps by a sort of balancing of interests, whether 
Jones was negligent, and, if he was, to order compensation. Jones was not (or 
presumably not directly) taking Mom&Pop's interests into account in his 
decisions about how to drive, and in a sense the court forces the consideration 
of those interests. Here judicial "balancing" to protect interests other than the 
actor's makes sense. But consider now a different sort of interaction between 
Jones and the store. If Jones decides he wants a new breakfast cereal, which 
Mom&Pop don't carry, and if as a result he transfers his entire grocery 
shopping to the local Giant Supermarket, it would never occur to us to 
suggest judicial review of this decision, to see if the benefit to Jones really 
justifies the loss to Mom&Pop. We can stipulate that Jones neither consults 
Mom&Pop nor considers their interests when he transfers his custom to 
Giant, but even so we do not even consider intervening. Why not? One 
obvious reason is that the market context of the decision means that (unlike 
in the negligent driving case) an appropriate comparison of interests is 
actually being made, implicitly. By deciding what to stock and at what price 
to sell it, Mom&Pop effectively announce how much Jones's business is 
worth to them (even though they are not thinking of Jones in particular). By 
responding to Mom&Pop's price-and-availability announcement on the basis 
of his own interests, Jones makes the comparison between what it is worth to 
Mom&Pop to have him as a customer and what it is worth to him to shop 
elsewhere. The required "balancing" of interests is done by the parties' joint 
contributions, through the market mechanism, to the ultimate determination 
of where Jones will shop. 
Now, Minnesota's decision not to buy non-returnable plastic milk 
containers is analogous, not to Jones's driving through Mom&Pop's window, 
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but to Jones's taking his grocery business elsewhere. What would be 
analogous to the negligence case is, say, Minnesota's sending some noxious 
effluent into Wisconsin's aquifers; such a case wouldn't actually be treated 
under the dormant commerce clause, but it would defmitely invite federal 
intervention to balance the states' interests. But just as judicial intervention is 
not needed when Jones abandons Mom&Pop for Giant, neither is it needed 
when Minnesota decides, on non-protectionist grounds, not to purchase 
plastic milk containers because they simply do not want them at the offered 
price (or, in this case, at any non-negative price). Minnesota's decision is a 
simple consumption decision, made by the state on behalf of all of its 
citizens, not to purchase particular goods; the market context allows us to 
infer that it is worth more to Minnesota to eschew the plastic containers than 
it is worth to the other states to sell them, just as the market context allowed 
us to infer that it was worth more to Jones to leave Mom&Pop than it was 
worth to them to keep him as a customer. The invisible hand of the market 
achieves its amazing welfare effects precisely because every market decision 
embodies this sort of local comparison of interests. (And as our parables 
remind us, decisions not to transact are as important for these purposes as 
decisions to transact.i5 
It might be objected that I cannot properly rely on a market-based 
mechanism for comparison of the relevant interests when Minnesota is in fact 
interfering in the market. There may be individual Minnesota consumers who 
disagree with Minnesota's collective choice. That is true, but irrelevant. 
Minnesota is perfectly entitled to speak for all Minnesota consumers as a 
group; from the federal point of view, we presume that Minnesota efficiently 
promotes the various interests of its citizens. Minnesota is entitled to prevent 
some Minnesota citizens from inflicting externalities on other Minnesota 
citizens by buying the eco-noxious foreign containers-and in doing so it 
promotes efficiency even though it prevents some individual citizens from 
doing as they would like. Indeed, so far as the federal constitution is 
concerned, Minnesota is entitled to be paternalistic and to protect Minnesota 
citizens against themselves, if, for example, the buyers of the containers are 
the very people who will be hurt when the ecosystem is degraded-and in 
doing this also Minnesota is promoting efficiency, at least if the paternalistic 
intervention is well-judged. There are some limits, of course, on Minnesota's 
freedom to speak for its citizens. In the American system, there are 
constitutional limitations, though these are notoriously weak where economic 
regulation is involved. (In the international context there are basic human 
rights protections embodied in international agreements.) But in the present 
context the point is this: whatever Minnesota can impose on its citizens by 
way of a domestic economic restriction it can extend to interstate market 
transactions, provided the extension is not a disguise for protectionist 
motivation.36 The undoubted fact that Minnesota can impose the restriction at 
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home shows that it violates no basic constitutional right; and with that 
established, Minnesota is entitled to speak for its citizens as a group in the 
interstate economic arena. It can do this, as I say, to protect some citizens 
against others, or to protect citizens against themselves. And we properly 
regard Minnesota's collective choice as representing the relevant interests of 
its citizens. 
I am not claiming that Minnesota invariably gets it right. But neither is 
Jones an infallible promoter of his own interests, nor Mom&Pop of theirs. 
Jones may be foolish to shop at Giant, or Mom&Pop may miscalculate. Still, 
no court is going to interfere. We sensibly presume Jones and Mom&Pop 
will do better at representing their own interests than a judge would. And we 
should presume the same of Minnesota. There may be failures in the political 
process, and, of course, such failures should be a matter of concern to 
Minnesotans. (Note, however, that we have set aside the sort of political 
failure which is most likely to affect interstate trade, by requiring that the law 
be motivated by something other than protectionism.) Even so, from the 
federal point of view we generally, and properly, presume that state political 
institutions do a better job of representing and reconciling in-state interests 
than federal institutions would. Absent some special reason for doubt (such 
as is reflected in various sorts of constitutional restriction), we should treat 
Minnesota governmental institutions as speaking authoritatively for 
Minnesota interests. And obviously, the mere fact that a state law has effects 
outside the state is not a reason to doubt that the law adequately represents 
the interests of citizens of the state. Of course, if the law has significant out-
of-state effects, then pointing out that it authoritatively embodies in-state 
interests is not invariably a conclusive defense of the law. We would not 
allow Minnesota to dump untreated sewage into Lake Superior just because 
that is the best thing on balance for citizens of Minnesota. But now we are 
back to the main point of the last few paragraphs: when the out-of-state 
effects are mediated by a market context, as they are in the milk-packaging 
case, then it does suffice that the Minnesota law authoritatively embodies the 
interests of Minnesota citizens; the out-of-state interests are accounted for by 
the terms on which out-of-staters offer market transactions. 
I think this is a powerful argument for why "virtual representation" by 
balancing is not required in "core" dormant commerce clause cases; powerful 
but simple in conception. Still, it took some years for it to filter gradually into 
my consciousness, and I can imagine that some readers may not be instantly 
persuaded. Let me therefore offer another argument, which is one of the 
intermediate forms in which this insight presented itself to me. If Minnesota 
dumps untreated sewage into Lake Superior, it is natural to say that it thereby 
harms or injures Wisconsin and Canada. In contrast, if Minnesota merely 
forbids the import of non-returnable plastic milk containers, it is not at all 
natural to say it harms or injures the manufacturers of such containers. To be 
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sure, the manufacturers of such containers are worse off as a result of 
Minnesota's decision, but this worse-off-ness is not the result of a harming or 
injuring. Minnesota neither denies nor infringes any right of its would-be 
suppliers, no more than Jones denies a right of Mom&Pop when he turns to 
Giant. We might say the manufacturers are denied a benefit, and that would 
be nearer the truth than claiming they were harmed; but even that doesn't 
sound exactly right. The truth is just that they have lost a (collective) 
customer. It's the same with Jones. If he drives his car through Mom&Pop's 
window, he injures them; if he takes his custom elsewhere, he disappoints 
them, no more. Courts are in the business of preventing harms, not 
preventing disappointments-which is why they deal with Jones's negligent 
driving and Minnesota's sewage, but not with Jones's and Minnesota's 
decisions about what goods to purchase and from whom. (There is much 
more that might be said about the fairly deep relation between the 
"harm/disappointment" argument and the "market accounting of interests" 
argument, and about their overlapping ranges of application. But no more 
here.) 
One last point about this "market accounting" argument. I have 
implicitly assumed that the argument applies to all "core" dormant commerce 
clause cases, and therefore explains why there is no need for balancing in any 
core case. I confess I have not thought all the way through to a demonstration 
of that assumption. What I can say is that the assumption is true for all the 
actual core cases that have produced Supreme Court decisions, and it seems 
intuitively right that it should be true for all core cases. But that is a loose end 
for the moment. Notice, on the other hand, that the assumption is not true of 
transportation/communication cases. Arizona's maximum train-length law, 
invalidated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona/7 may have reflected perfectly 
the interests of Arizona citizens, but there was no market context for 
Arizona's choice which gave the Court any reason to assume it reflected out-
of-state interests as well. 
The "Judicial Competence" Objection to Balancing, 
and Purpose Review as a Decision about Deference 
Time to pause and take stock. We began with an argument in favor of 
purpose review, and that led us to a refutation of the standard argument for 
balancing. We saw that in core cases, balancing is unnecessary in principle; 
the protection it supposedly offers for out-of-state interests is not needed. At 
this point, the largely familiar judicial-competence argument against 
balancing may seem almost anti-climactic. But I want to rehearse it briefly, 
because it will lead us back to a richer understanding of purpose review. 
In a nutshell, the Court should not balance because balancing requires 
judgments better left to the legislature. It is worth distinguishing two sorts of 
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judgment. If we are going to balance the benefits and the costs of a law, we 
must first identifY the actual consequences of the law; that is an empirical 
question. Then we must attach values to the various consequences and decide 
whether the overall consequences are good or bad on balance; that is a 
normative question. The commonest objection to balancing is that the courts 
are not competent to make the empirical judgments required; and that is often 
true. But another objection, and one which to my mind has even more force, 
is that the courts have no warrant to make the normative judgments required. 
In general, deciding what consequences are worth pursuing, and at what cost, 
is just what we have legislatures for. 38 And in a federal or quasi-federal 
system, the argument that courts should not make normative judgments in the 
standard run of cases is even stronger. As I have noted above, in such a 
system we have multiple legislatures at the lower level precisely so they can 
pursue different values. It would be inappropriate even for federal legislative 
institutions, if such exist, to impose a centralized value system without 
specific warrant. For courts to impose centralized values, without a clear 
necessity, is therefore doubly problematic. 
Since I have particularly emphasized the case against judicial imposition 
of value choices by balancing, it is worth noting that there is one kind of case 
where the court might engage in a sort of degenerate "balancing" without 
being required to make any value judgment at all. That is the case where the 
court fmds as an empirical matter that the law under review does not achieve 
any of the putative benefit. If there is really no benefit, then no normative 
judgment comparing values is required. Even here, however, we might think 
the court should not second-guess the legislature on the empirical judgment. 
The United States Supreme Court, for example, does not second-guess the 
legislature in applying the "rational basis/minimum scrutiny" test under the 
Equal Protection clause (applicable to social and economic legislation 
involving neither fundamental rights nor any suspect classification). As long 
as the Court does not believe the law was adopted for the bare purpose of 
discriminating against some unpopular group, then it suffices to uphold the 
law that "there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 
a rational basis for the classification. "39 The Court does not decide for itself 
even the baseline empirical question of whether there is any actual benefit at 
all. 
Perhaps this seems too draconian a self-limitation. Perhaps it seems there 
are some empirical judgments that the court can make as well as the 
legislature. Indeed, an example might be the question of whether, on the 
current scientific evidence, there is any danger at all to human health from 
eating hormone-added duck meat (or beef). I take it a central holding of the 
WTO Appellate Body's decision in EU - Hormones is that the SPS 
Agreement requires WTO tribunals to scrutinize legislative decisions on this 
sort of issue more closely than a United States court would do. Even so, the 
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Hormones Problem I 07 
requirement on the legislature is primarily procedural. The Appellate Body 
does not say either that the tribunal may substitute its own judgment for the 
legislature's, or that the legislature must follow the dominant scientific view. 
Provided there is a risk assessment, a minority scientific view may suffice to 
support a restriction.40 There is wisdom in the Appellate Body's restraint. To 
say the court can do as well as the legislature is not to say they can do better, 
and I see little reason to think they can. So, the case for judicial deference to 
the legislature may be at its weakest here, but it still seems preferable, other 
things being equal, that the decision be made by the more politically 
responsive body. This suggestion is strengthened when we remember that 
whatever danger the legislature is concerned with, it is unlikely that the 
tribunal can assert in good conscience that the probability associated with 
that danger is zero. Even the dominant scientific opinion of the moment may 
be wrong. As soon as there is a non-zero probability of harm, we have not 
just the empirical question of what the probability is, but also the normative 
question of how to respond to uncertainty. This seems to be a question the 
legislature should decide. 
In sum, the argument against judicial balancing is an argument for 
deference to the legislature. We are now in a position to see that this 
deference argument against balancing and the efficiency argument for 
purpose review are like the negative and positive of a photograph. A finding 
of protectionist purpose on the part of the legislature does two things. It tells 
us that the law will result in inefficiency. It also undercuts the case for 
judicial deference: a legislative decision motivated by protectionism precisely 
fails to make empirical or normative judgments a court should respect. On 
the other hand, so long as the legislature's purpose is not protectionist, then 
their non-protectionist purpose, whatever it is, reflects their evaluation of the 
expected effects; their decision can be presumed efficient; and the court 
should defer. So, the inquiry into protectionist purpose determines at one and 
the same time whether there is an efficiency objection and whether deference 
is appropriate. 
But can the courts identify protectionist purpose? In the American 
context, I unhesitatingly answer "yes".41 As I have said before, the evidence 
the court may consider is not limited to outright expressions of protectionist 
purpose. The court can consider the structure of the law; the intuitive 
plausibility of the distinctions the law makes; the similarity to laws 
elsewhere; the zeal of the legislature for pursuing the asserted goal in other 
contexts; whatever is known about the support for the law and the political 
context outside and inside the legislature; the timing of the law; all in 
addition to legislative history to the extent it is available.42 (It is also worth 
mentioning that legislators and other officials pursuing protectionism are 
often surprisingly candid about their motives-which becomes less surprising 
if we reflect that they want political credit.) It is irrelevant that the legislature, 
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or even the particular legislative majority, is not all of one mind; the question 
is how to characterize the decision of the body as a whole. The connection 
that we have pointed out between the issue of protectionist purpose and the 
argument for deference may suggest a helpful formulation of the question: 
Did the legislature, within the usual limitations of legislative decision-
making, make a decision on grounds that should be deferred to? If the law 
was supported by legislators with a variety of different purposes, then I 
suggest the question is roughly whether the contribution of protectionist 
purpose was a but-for cause of the adoption of the law. If it was, then the 
legislature as a body has not endorsed non-protectionist empirical and 
evaluative judgments that the court can defer to. (And if it was not, then they 
have.) What if it appears the legislature did not think at all, that they merely 
rubber-stamped the proposal of some lobbyist, or of some small set of 
members, or the views of their constituents? Then it is appropriate to take as 
the motivation of the legislature the motivation of that source. It is the 
legislature's prerogative not to think, but if they choose not to, they are 
responsible for the motivations of whomever they let do their thinking for 
them. Notice also that the question of the overall purpose of some law is 
quite different from the question of the legislature's "purpose" with regard to 
some very specific question like whether motorized roller-blades count as a 
"vehicle in the park." About a question like that, there may indeed be no 
actual legislative "purpose" in any sense; it is possible that nothing like that 
question occurred to anyone, and that the general principles that were agreed 
on do not settle it. But a law never lacks for overall motivation, either on the 
part of those who voted for it or on the part of those who secured the others' 
votes. 
Nothing will make the decision what the legislature was really up to a 
mechanical one; but American judges are much better prepared for 
identifYing legislative purpose than for making the decisions required under a 
balancing test. Aside from legal doctrine, the one thing American judges as a 
group can be presumed to be informed about and to have a feel for is politics. 
They have all been either elected themselves (in many state systems) or 
appointed by politicians. Despite their separation from day-to-day politics, 
American judges are definitely members of the political class. This argument 
has less force in the international context. Members of international tribunals 
are not likely to be political innocents, but neither can they have the insider's 
view of most of the systems whose laws they must review. On the other hand, 
the argument for deference may be correspondingly strengthened; in the 
abstract, international judges have even less warrant than domestic judges to 
second-guess the legislature's evaluations, if those evaluations are free of the 
taint of protectionism. So I am left thinking that, absent specific treaty 
provisions to the contrary, purpose review is to be preferred to anything like 
balancing even in the international context. (Are there further possibilities to 
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consider, which are neither purpose review nor balancing? Obviously, there 
may be procedural requirements, such as the SPS Agreement imposes. Aside 
from that, I do not think there are other plausible substantive tests; but that is 
not a thesis I can argue here.) 
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Dumb Duck Disease 
Deciding the Arimani Duck Meat Case 
So, after all that propaedeutic, is the Arimani law constitutional or not? Is it 
motivated by protectionist purpose? On this "record," it's hard to say (though 
I shall take a position presently). Some readers will take my hesitation as 
confirmation of the emptiness of the purpose test; but that would be a 
mistake. Aside from the fact that, as I said before, no plausible test can make 
every case an easy case, any judge faced with this case in the real world 
would know more about it than we are told. (I hope it is not necessary to say 
that while I express dissatisfaction as a "judge" with the "record" in the case, 
I am not in any way criticizing the authors of the hypothetical. Especially not, 
given how much I hate to write exams.) 
For example, hormones are a real-world problem; there is no doubt that 
in some contexts the administration of hormones and hormone-like 
substances can cause or facilitate cancer and perhaps other morbid 
conditions. That means that, whether or not hormone residues in food pose a 
real danger, it is easy to imagine real-world anti-hormone laws like the EU's 
being adopted for non-protectionist reasons. But "dumb duck disease" is 
entirely hypothetical, which means it is impossible to have any feel at all for 
important aspects of the social and political context out of which this law is 
imagined to arise. It might be suggested that this lack of social and political 
context, even if it is far from the experience of the American judge, makes 
the hypothetical a good representation of the situation in which the 
international judge finds herself. That seems to me an exaggeration. 
International adjudicators are mostly citizens ofthe world. The basic sorts of 
danger that prompt countries to enact SPS measures are much the same 
around the world. Of course, there are local dangers, and local beliefs, and 
local politics-but I suspect that any record developed in an actual WTO 
proceeding would give the members of the tribunal more of a feel for the 
social and political background than can be gleaned from our hypothetical. 
There is much else (aside from the general social/political context) that I 
would like to know about our case; but the one other thing I would most like 
to know about, and that I think I inevitably would know something more 
about in an actual case, is the nature of the Arimani "Institute for Public 
Health". Was their report produced by trained scientists attempting to do 
serious research (even if they may be self-selected for certain proclivities and 
I 10 The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation 
also be under perfectly appropriate systemic pressures to be sensitive to 
risk-ail of which I suspect describes the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, for example), or was it produced by bureaucratic hacks 
merely parroting the government line? Perhaps I will be told that, in the 
international context, there is no way I would know which of these 
descriptions better fit the relevant Institute, but I find that hard to believe-
and in any event this is something I need to know not just to apply the 
purpose test, but to decide whether there is "scientific evidence" under the 
SPS Agreement. 
My decision, on the record as it stands? The Arimani law is upheld. State 
laws are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality; there is simply no 
evidence of protectionist purpose adequate to overcome that presumption. I 
assume that the Arimani Institute for Public Health does genuine science. It is 
hard to imagine why there is such a divergence of scientific opinion. If I were 
compelled to decide the scientific question on this very problematic record, I 
might say there is no danger from dumb duck disease. But happily that is not 
the question I must decide. The question is whether the Arimani law 
embodies a protectionist purpose. Possible dangers from hormone residues in 
food are not a comic-book fantasy, even if the best scientific evidence ofthe 
moment may suggest there is no danger. If either Arimani consumers or the 
Arimani legislature believe there is a danger from hormone-fed ducks, and if 
that, rather than protectionism, is the motivation for the law, the law must be 
upheld. There is, to be sure, discriminatory effect that benefits most Arimani 
duck producers (though the only political action by Arimani duck producers 
that we are informed of is a protest against the law by hormone-using 
producers). It is not surprising that there should be a correlation between 
consumer preferences or beliefs and the dominant practice in the local 
industry-there will be causal influences in both directions (as well as joint 
causes of both phenomena). Consumer distrust of hormones and industry 
avoidance of them are likely to be found together, even without assuming 
that the industry has stirred up the fears. It would be ironic if, in such a 
situation, the mere fact of discriminatory effect prevented the government 
from acting on consumers' concerns. It is not the function of the court either 
to educate the legislature in "good science" or to educate society to the merits 
of foreign products, provided those products are not excluded just because of 
their origin. The law is upheld. 
Additional Questions 
Let me now address the specific questions posed to Panelists. I shall take 
them in groups, with some rearrangement. Many of my answers are mere 
applications of what I have already said, but there is some new substance 
scattered through. 
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Questions I, 3, 4 
(About de facto Discrimination) 
It absolutely matters that we are dealing with discriminatory effect (which I 
take to be what the question means by de facto discrimination) and not 
explicit discrimination. Explicit discrimination is virtually per se illegal. 
Discriminatory effect is relevant only as one sort of evidence of 
discriminatory purpose; in itself, it is not even a prima facie violation calling 
for justification. Discriminatory effect therefore does not trigger any 
requirement of "exoneration" (Question 4). On the other hand, weak causal 
linkages may tend to "exonerate" in the sense that when we are considering 
discriminatory effect as evidence of bad purpose, it seems likely that the 
more indirect the link between the putative innocent purpose and the 
discriminatory effect, the less persuasive is the discriminatory effect as 
evidence of bad purpose. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery may be an 
example, since the principal discriminatory effect of the Minnesota law was 
not in the market for milk packaging but in the market for inputs to milk 
packaging (plastic resins versus wood pulp). 
Questions 2, 5, 6, 7 (in part), 10, 18, 21 
(About the Relevance of Various Sorts of Evidence) 
Since the ultimate question is whether the law was adopted with protectionist 
purpose, the relevance of evidence is tested by its relevance to that question. 
It is relevant whether there are other dangers from ducks (such as from 
feeding them in the park) that the legislature has not acted against; but it is a 
commonplace that the legislature may proceed "one step at a time" and that 
there may be many reasons for attacking one source of a danger but not 
another. If feeding in the park accounts for 2% of dumb duck disease, that 
will do little to show bad purpose. If feeding in the park accounts for 82%, I 
would certainly want some good explanation of why the legislature acted 
against the food-borne danger but not this one. The same general ideas apply 
to the failure to act against hormones in beef (although I take it hormones in 
beef do not cause "dumb duck disease"-it could be that hormones are a 
danger in duck meat but not in beet). Evidence from other countries is 
relevant precisely insofar as it may affect our view of the sincerity of the 
Arimani legislature. Similarly with the comparison to international or other 
widely adopted standards; here I think Arimania has more to gain from a 
showing that its concern is widespread than it has to lose from a showing that 
it is not. There is no question of Arimania being categorically required to 
justify its "deviation" from any other standards (except, of course, a 
controlling federal law, in which case the Arimani law is just preempted, no 
further questions asked). 
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Questions 7, 8, 15, 16, 17 
(About How Judges Should Choose between "Efficiency" and "Democratic 
Legitimacy"-or How Much to "Defer" to Legislatures-in Domestic and 
International Contexts) 
It is defmitely not the role of the court to require in general that governments 
be efficient (though it is the court's role to suppress the specific inefficiency 
of protectionism). I would also emphasize that often where trade lawyers 
think there is a conflict between national autonomy and efficiency, there is 
actually no conflict. Conflicts between autonomy and trade-maximization are 
endemic, because nations have many reasons, including many non-
protectionist ones, for restricting trade. But trade-maximization is not the 
same as efficiency, for reasons I sketched in section 2.43 Efficiency normally 
requires that nations' non-protectionist choices be respected; in such cases, 
efficiency and autonomy point in the same direction, even if it is the direction 
of reduced trade. 
As to the questions about the degree of deference, "deference" is a 
problematic concept; even what it might mean varies with different 
substantive views. In the purpose theory, for instance, "deference" is an all-
or-nothing matter, and the crucial question about purpose is in effect a 
determination whether deference is appropriate or not. Pressed for an abstract 
answer to Questions 15 and 16 that might be relevant to other theories, I 
would be tempted to say there is no reason for international tribunals to be 
especially deferential, as long as they are exercising the powers delegated to 
them by treaty. (I admit to liking that deferential-seeming doctrine of treaty 
interpretation, in dubio mitius; but it seems to me there is a difference 
between, on the one hand, being restrained in the interpretation of the basic 
treaty obligation, as in dubio mitius recommends, but then enforcing the 
obligation straightforwardly, and, on the other hand, asserting a wide 
obligation but then being "deferential" case-by-case in enforcing it, which I 
find hard to justify. This distinction would obviously bear more discussion.) 
Tribunals should be careful not to overstep their authority; and they should be 
sensitive in applying the rules, whatever they are, to the variety of cultures. If 
the tribunals will do this, any remaining problems about the political 
acceptability of the world trading system must be dealt with by national 
governments: by improving the system, by educating people about its 
benefits, and by seeing that the benefits are in fact equitably distributed, both 
within and between nations. 
Qlfestions 9, 14 
(The Seriousness of the Danger, the Precautionary Principle, and the Duty 
to Reexamine Legislation in Light of New Facts) 
The seriousness of the danger matters precisely because it is relevant to the 
determination of purpose. Other things equal, the legislature is much more 
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likely to have been genuinely motivated by what they perceived to be a 
serious danger than by a trivial one. The "precautionary principle" as such 
(that is, as an exception to some other duty) has no role in a purpose-based 
theory. But obviously a legislature may plausibly and innocently act against 
dangers for which the scientific evidence is slim (or in a narrow sense of 
"evidence," non-existent). 
Since there is no "precautionary principle" in the purpose theory, there is 
no duty of reexamination associated with the precautionary principle. But the 
question about reexamination does raise an interesting problem for a purpose-
based theory. Suppose a law was adopted with no bad purpose, but 
circumstances have changed enough since the law was adopted so that if it 
were readopted now, would we be strongly inclined to view it as motivated 
by protectionism? Obviously, non-repeal consciously motivated by 
protectionism is as inimical to the basic values of the system as a new 
protectionist law.44 If the legislature is just unconscious, then we have in 
principle no ground of invalidity; but it is of course open to any injured party 
or nation to bring it to the legislature's attention that the law no longer serves 
any non-protectionist interest. At this point I think we might presume that 
non-repeal is motivated by protectionism and invalidate the law, unless the 
legislature acts in such a way as to persuade us that they genuinely believe in 
the continuing non-protectionist utility of the law. In this way, we can 
construct a limited "duty of reexamination" within the purpose theory. 
Questions 11, 12, 13 
(How to Decide Which Scientists to Believe) 
The purpose-based theory does not require the judge to evaluate scientific 
reports in the sense of deciding who has the right answer. The only question 
is what the legislature might plausibly have relied on, a considerably easier 
question in most cases. Of course, considerations like the source and apparent 
persuasiveness of the report are relevant. 
Questions 19, 20 
("Less Restrictive Alternative" Analysis, and Labeling) 
"Less restrictive alternative" analysis is relevant to both a purpose-based 
theory and a balancing theory, though it functions differently in the two 
contexts. It raises no new issue of principle in either. The existence of a less 
restrictive alternative is relevant in the purpose-based theory because the 
existence of an alternative which would achieve the full local benefit with 
less effect on trade suggests that the more trade-restrictive measure was 
chosen for its additional protectionist effect. But, of course, a crucial question 
is whether the legislature believed the alternative was fully adequate. Note 
that if they sincerely believed it was not, but the reviewing court is convinced 
that it is, then we have the same sort of situation as when the reviewing court 
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finds no benefit at all from a measure, contrary to the legislature's sincere 
belief. As I said before, judicial intervention is at its least objectionable here, 
since the result of invalidation can be reached by substituting the court's 
empirical judgment for the legislature's but without the need for an evaluative 
decision by the court. Even so, I would not intervene. 
In the context of a balancing theory, where the court is already 
committed to making evaluative judgments, less restrictive alternative 
analysis has a wider scope, since the court can decide that even an alternative 
which does not achieve all the benefits of the local law should be preferred if 
the benefit that would be lost by moving to the alternative is less than the cost 
to trade that would be avoided. We might refer to this metaphorically as 
"balancing at the margin." This difference, between the way less restrictive 
alternative analysis fits into a balancing theory and the way it fits into the 
purpose theory, explains why less restrictive alternative analysis plays an 
independent role in, for example, American first amendment law (which 
involves balancing), but does not play an independent role, despite being 
regularly mentioned, in "core" dormant commerce clause cases. 
Since Question 20 refers to labeling, let me close with a tendentious 
comment. Labeling is the all-purpose "less restrictive alternative" of the trade 
partisan. (Not specifically in this Question, where the point is implicitly made 
that the effects oflabeling depend heavily on local conditions.) But it is a rare 
case in which labeling, even with a literate and consumer-conscious 
population, will fully achieve the goals of a broader prohibition. Labeling 
will do that only if (I) there are no concerns about external effects from the 
consumer's purchase or use of the product,45 and (2) any harm to the 
consumer herself is one the legislature is willing to let her suffer if she 
chooses it voluntarily (the legislature is not required to be willing-
international trade law contains no anti-paternalism principle). In sum, 
labeling is often less restrictive, but it is rarely a fully effective alternative. 
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2. Art. I, §8, cl. 3. 
3. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). 
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The Product/Process Distinction-An Illusory Basis for Disciplining "Unilateralism" in Trade 
Policy, EJIL II (2000), No. 2, 249-89. In this case, it is clear that the process of using growth 
hormones is forbidden because it is thought to affect the constitution of the meat itself at the 
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23. And what if the legislature never thought at all, simply rubber-stamping a proposal from 
some lobbyist? The point is that whoever drafted the statute must have been motivated by 
protectionism, and the legislature either endorsed that motivation or made no substantive 
decision at all. In either case, a protectionist motive can be attributed to the legislature; there is 
no decision deserving of judicial deference. See section 2. 
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33. I simplify slightly. The primary discriminatory effect was actually in the market for inputs to 
plastic and paper packaging, that is, plastic resins and wood pulp. 
34. The phrase "unavoidably incidental to the achievement of that purpose" is included in the 
statement in the text to leave room for "less restrictive alternative analysis," of which more 
below (section 3, the discussion of Questions 19, 20). The statement in the text also assumes that 
the law achieves its non-protectionist purpose. If the law is so misguided as to achieve no 
benefit, then it is inefficient, though, of course, it may still be that the court should defer to the 
legislature's empirical determination that there is some benefit, as I shall argue below. Notice 
that a law which is inefficient because there is no benefit at all is inefficient whether or not it has 
an interstate discriminatory effect, so interstate discriminatory effect still is not the real ground of 
objection. 
Incidentally, since I have argued that the inefficiency of protectionism is fundamentally 
tied up with purpose, I am moved to point out that even classic tariffs and import embargoes and 
the like are not inefficient if they are motivated by an intrinsic preference for autarky (which 
need not be based on crude xenophobia). In the real world, of course, protectionism is not 
normally the result of an intrinsic preference for autarky (which is why standard discussions 
never even mention this possibility); in the real world, protectionism is a collectively self-
defeating attempt to secure local advantage at others' expense. Indeed, no state which joined the 
United States, and no country which has joined the EU or the WTO could possibly claim to have 
a significant intrinsic preference for autarky, so the point is of theoretical interest only. But it 
does remind us that, at bottom, efficiency is about satisfying preferences ("permissible" 
preferences, if you prefer, but there is no reason a non-xenophobic intrinsic preference for 
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35. Two further points: (!) Of course, the market mechanism will not work if there are 
significant third-party effects from Jones's decision to take his custom to Giant or from 
Minnesota's regulation of milk packaging (third-party effects which are not themselves mediated 
through further market relations). But there are not likely to be such effects in the Jones case, nor 
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41. It is worth mentioning that, aside from the dormant commerce clause, purpose review is an 
established element of suspect classification equal protection law, establishment clause law, and 
free speech law. 
42. For a similar list of considerations relevant to showing purpose, see Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
43. See also Howse/Regan, supra note 4, at 279--85. 
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